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Abstract
The evolution of cooperation described in terms of simple two-person interactions has received considerable attention in
recent years, where several key results were obtained. Among those, it is now well established that the web of social
interaction networks promotes the emergence of cooperation when modeled in terms of symmetric two-person games. Up
until now, however, the impacts of the heterogeneity of social interactions into the emergence of cooperation have not
been fully explored, as other aspects remain to be investigated. Here we carry out a study employing the simplest example
of a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the benefits collected by the participants may be proportional to the costs
expended. We show that the heterogeneous nature of the social network naturally induces a symmetry breaking of the
game, as contributions made by cooperators may become contingent on the social context in which the individual is
embedded. A new, numerical, mean-field analysis reveals that prisoner’s dilemmas on networks no longer constitute a
defector dominance dilemma—instead, individuals engage effectively in a general coordination game. We find that the
symmetry breaking induced by population structure profoundly affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation,
dramatically enhancing the feasibility of cooperators: cooperation blooms when each cooperator contributes the same cost,
equally shared among the plethora of games in which she participates. This work provides clear evidence that, while
individual rational reasoning may hinder cooperative actions, the intricate nature of social interactions may effectively
transform a local dilemma of cooperation into a global coordination problem.
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Introduction
Portuguese is no exception: Like any other language, it has
many proverbs and popular sayings. One of them states something
like: I have already contributed to that charity [1], concerning originally
situations in which individuals are faced with the decision of
offering (or not) a contribution to a common venture, the
expression above meaning ‘‘no’’. Interestingly, the amount given
is never stated. It turns out that, quite often, we are confronted
with situations in which the act of giving is more important than
the amount given. Let us keep with a charity event, in which some
celebrities are invited to participate. Typically their appearance is
given maximal audience, and they are shown contributing a
seemingly large amount of money to the charity’s cause. This offer
is aimed at stimulating the contribution of many to the same
charity, and indeed this mechanism of ‘‘celebrity participation in
charities’’ is common, and presumably effective. But what is the
relevance of the amount contributed by the celebrity? It is
certainly impressive to many, despite being, most likely, a small
contribution, both in face of the celebrity’s wealth and also in what
concerns the overall amount accumulated. But it does induce,
hopefully, a large number of (much smaller) contributions from
anonymous (non-celebrities, the overwhelming majority) charity
participants, who feel compelled to contribute given the fact that
their role model (the celebrity) contributed. In other words, the
majority copies (imitates) the act of giving, but certainly not the
amount given.
Nowadays, web-signed petitions are also examples of collective
decisions which, often, benefit from the fact that some well-
known people adhere to the petition’s cause. Besides those who
are fully aware and agree with the cause, there are also those who
sign the petition simply because they admire someone who has
signed the petition, again copying the attitude. Many other
examples from real life could be provided along similar lines,
from trivia, to fads, to stock markets, to Humanitarian causes up
to the salvation of planet Earth [2–4]. From a theoretical
perspective, many of these situations provide beautiful examples
of public goods games [5,6] (PGG) which are often hard to
dissociate from reputation building, social norms and moral
principles [7–11]. This intricate interplay reflects the many-body
nature and multi-level complexity of the interactions among the
‘‘social atoms’’ [12].
The simplest PGG involves two persons. Both have the
opportunity to contribute a cost c to a common pool. A Cooperator
(C) is one who contributes; otherwise she is a Defector (D). The total
amount is multiplied by an enhancement factor F and equally
shared between the two participants. Hence, player i (i=1, 2) using
strategy si (si=1ifC,0i fD) gets a payoff Pi~Fc s1zs2 ðÞ =2{csi
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CD
C
D
F{1 ðÞ cF c =2{c
Fc=20
 !
ð1Þ
For Fƒ1 Ds dominate unconditionally. For F=2no strategy is
favored in well mixed populations (neutral drift); yet, for Fw2,i ti s
better to play C despite the fact that, in a mixed pair, a D collects a
higher payoff than a C. For 1vFv2 the game is an example of
the famous symmetric one-shot two-person prisoner’s dilemma
[13], on which many central results have been obtained over the
years, in particular in the context of evolutionary game theory
[14,15]: In 1992 [16] it has been explicitly shown that population
structure matters, despite its importance being recognized already
by Darwin, albeit in the form of Group selection [17,18]. It clearly
makes a difference whether everybody is equally likely to interact
with anybody else in the population or not (see also [19]). In 2004
we learnt that evolutionary game theory in finite populations may
behave very differently from that on infinite populations [20], even
in the absence of any population structure, Evolutionarily Stable
Strategies (ESS) becoming population size dependent. In 2005 we
learnt that heterogeneous population structures play an important
role in the evolution of cooperation under the prisoner’s and other
social dilemmas [21,22], a result which spawned a number of
investigations [23–29] (see also Szabo ´ and Fa ´th for a recent review
[30]). In 2006 a mathematical condition was obtained for Cst o
become advantageous on populations structured along the links of
homogeneous networks [31], subsequently confirmed making use
of inclusive fitness methods [32] for a limited subset of game payoff
matrices. This result, valid in the limit of weak selection, has also
unraveled an important feature of evolutionary game theoretical
studies: The outcome of cooperation depends on the evolutionary
dynamics adopted, dictating how individual strategy evolves from
generation to generation. Furthermore, evolutionary game
dynamics on populations structured along multiple networks has
been explored [33,34], as well as the mechanisms which favor
cooperation under adaptive population structures have been
identified, both for non-repeated [35–43] and repeated games
[44,45]. These results consubstantiate and keep stimulating an
enormous amount of research work.
Common to all these studies are the settings underlying the
social dilemma: in the conventional view, every C pays a fixed cost
c per game, providing the same benefit b to the partner. However,
if what matters is the act of giving and not the amount given, then
there is no reason to assume that everybody contributes the same
cost c to each game. Depending on the amount of each individual
contribution, the overall result of the evolutionary dynamics may
change. The two person game introduced above provides not only
the ideal ground to introduce such a diversity of contributions, but
also an intuitive coupling between game dynamics and social
embedding: The first (second) individual contributes a cost c1 (c2)i f
playing C and nothing otherwise. Hence, player i (i=1, 2) now
gets the following payoff from this game:
Pi~Fc 1s1zc2s2 ðÞ =2{cisi ð2Þ
reflecting the symmetry breaking induced by possibly different
contributions from different cooperating individuals. This poses a
natural question: Who will acquire an evolutionary edge under
these conditions?
Often the amount that each individual contributes is correlated
with the social context she is actually embedded in [28,46,47].
Modern communities are grounded in complex social networks of
investment and cooperation, in which some individuals play
radically different roles and interact more and more often than
others. Empirical studies have demonstrated that social networks
share both small-world properties and heterogeneous distribution
of connectivities [48–50]. In such heterogeneous communities,
where different individuals may be embedded in very different
social environments, it is indeed hard to imagine that every C will
always provide the same amount in every game interaction, hence
reducing the problem to the standard two-person prisoner’s
dilemma studied so far. In the context of N-person games played
in prototypical social networks, it has been found that the diversity
of contributions greatly favors cooperation [28]. However, and
similar to the relation between two-body and many-body
interactions in the Physical Sciences, N-person public goods
games have an intrinsic complexity which cannot be anticipated
from two-person games: In the words of late William Hamilton,
‘‘The theory of many person games may seem to stand to that of two-person
games in the relation of sea-sickness to a headache’’ [51].
Here, and besides the conventional scenario in which every C
contributes the same cost c to each game she participates, we shall
also explore the limit in which every C contributes the same
overall amount c. However, this amount is shared between all
games she participates, which are defined by the social network in
which the players are embedded. For instance, c may be
interpreted as the availability or the amount of resources each
individual has to dedicate to all her commitments. Hence, the
contribution to each game will depend now on the social context
(number of partners) of each C, and heterogeneity will foster a
symmetry breaking of pair-wise interactions, as two individuals
may contribute different amounts to the same game. In this sense,
cooperation will be identified with the act of giving and no longer
with the amount given.
Results
Figure 1 shows the final fraction of Cs for different classes of
population structures and different contribution paradigms. At
each time-step, every individual engages in a 2-person PGG with
each of her neighbors. The accumulated payoff resultant from all
Author Summary
Humans contribute to a broad range of cooperative
endeavors. In many of them, the amount or effort
contributed often depends on the social context of each
individual. Recent evidence has shown how modern
societies are grounded in complex and heterogeneous
networks of exchange and cooperation, in which some
individuals play radically different roles and/or interact
more than others. We show that such social heterogeneity
drastically affects the behavioral dynamics and promotes
cooperative behavior, whenever the social dilemma
perceived by each individual is contingent on her/his
social context. The multiplicity of roles and contributions
induced by realistic population structures is shown to
transform an initial defection dominance dilemma into a
coordination challenge or even a cooperator dominance
game. While locally defection may seem inescapable,
globally there is an emergent new dilemma in which
cooperation often prevails, illustrating how collective
cooperative action may emerge from myopic individual
selfishness.
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which determines the behavior in the next generation [15]. We
adopt the so-called pairwise comparison rule [52–54] for the social
learning dynamics: Each individual copies the behavior of a
randomly chosen neighbor with a probability which increases with
the fitness difference (see Methods for details).
Figure 1a shows the outcome of evolving the conventional 2-
person PD (1,F,2), in which case each player contributes a fixed
amount c to each game she participates. Different population
structures are considered, one associated with a (homogeneous)
regular network (REG), the other with a (strongly heterogeneous)
scale-free network (SF). Real social networks fall somewhere
between these limits [55], and hence we also investigate a third
class of population structure, represented by an exponential
network (EXP), exhibiting a level of heterogeneity intermediate
between the previous two.
The existence of a minority of highly connected individuals in
SF networks (line and circles) allows the population to preserve
high cooperative standards, while on homogeneous networks (line
and filled squares) Ds dominate for the entire range of parameters
[21,22], as a result of the pairwise comparison rule adopted [56].
Heterogeneous networks thus pave the way for the emergence of
cooperation. Highly connected individuals (i.e. hubs) work as
catalysers of cooperative behavior, as their large number of
interactions allows them to accumulate a high fitness. This, in
turn, leads them to act as role models for a large number of social
ties. To the extent that hubs are Cs, they influence the vast
majority of the population to follow their behavior [23]. Clearly,
this feature has a stronger impact on SF networks than on EXP
networks, the difference between these two types of networks
stemming from the presence or absence, respectively, of the
preferential attachment mechanism.
The results in Figure 1a are based on the assumption that each
C contributes the same cost c to each game she plays – which we
denote by conventional prisoner’s dilemma (CPD). This assumption is
relaxed in Figure 1b where Cs now equally distribute the same cost
c among all games they play – the regime we denote by distributed
prisoner’s dilemma (DPD). Figure 1b shows what happens in this
limit. While on homogeneous networks the fate of cooperation is
the same as before 2 it amounts to rescaling of the intensity of
selection 2 heterogeneity in the amount contributed by each
individual to each game creates a remarkable boost in the final
number of Cs for the entire range of F, which increases with
increasing heterogeneity of the underlying network. Comparison
with the results of Figure 1a shows that under DPD preferential
attachment plays a prominent role, since it constitutes the network
wiring mechanism distinguishing EXP networks from SF
networks. Changing from CPD to DPD induces moderate boosts
in the equilibrium fraction of Cso nEXP networks, but a
spectacular boost of cooperation on SF networks: Hubs become
extremely influential under DPD.
In order to understand the mechanism underlying the
population-wide boost of cooperation obtained, we consider a
prototypical element of a heterogeneous network (similarly to what
has been done in [28,30,31]) as shown in Figure 2, and investigate
the microscopic balance determining individual change. In partic-
ular, we investigate under which conditions the central C on the
left – a stereotypical hub –becomes advantageous, that is,
accumulates a higher fitness than any of her neighbors (see
Figure 2). We consider a C-hub with z1 links (k1 of which are Cs,
left in Figure 2) and a D-hub with z2 links (k2 of which are Cs, right
in Figure 2). We assume, for simplicity, that all neighbors of the C
hub have z1L links each (k1L of which are Cs), whereas all
neighbors of the D hub have z2L links (k2L of which are Cs). The
remaining nodes have z0 links, where z0 stands, e.g., for the
average connectivity of the population. We implicitly assume that
the neighbors of the hubs have smaller connectivities, and
consequently we call them leaves.
The conditions are explicitly provided in Figure 2 for both DPD
and CPD. In both paradigms, for the C-hub to invade the D-hub (or
any of her D-leaf neighbors) depends crucially on the difference
between thenumberk1 ofC-neighbors oftheC-huband the numberk2
(k1L)o fC-neighbors of the D-hub (D-leaf). In both DPD and CPD the
invasion threshold is always smaller for leaf invasion compared to
hubinvasion. Furthermore, the thresholdfor invasion is also smaller
under DPD compared to CPD. Finally, as one would expect, all
thresholds coincide when networks are homogeneous, the threshold
conditions making it harder for invasion to occur in these networks.
As a result, on heterogeneousnetworks,theconditionswhich render
a C-hub advantageous with respect to a D-hub are more stringent
than those associated with invasion of a neighbor D-leaf, which leads
to an invasion pattern in which leaves are invaded before hubs [23].
Furthermore, one should not overlook that successful Dst e n dt o
place other Ds in their neighborhood [23] which acts as a negative
feedback mechanismreducing their fitnessin time.On the contrary,
Figure 1. Fraction of Cooperators as a function of the
enhancement factor F. Upper panel: Under CPD Cooperation is able
to dominate on Scale-free networks (lines and circles), unlike what
happens on regular structures (lines and filled squares). On exponential
networks, intermediate levels of cooperation emerge, as a result of the
heterogeneity of such topologies. Lower panel: Under DPD the
advantage of Cs is dramatically enhanced when the same cost is
evenly shared among each one’s neighbors. The results were obtained
for networks of 10
3 nodes and an average degree z=4. As expected,
abandoning the well-mixed regime leads to a break-up of neutrality for
F=2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596.g001
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neighborhood, reinforcing their fitness.
The impact of the DPD paradigm, however, is most dramatic if
one takes into consideration that the condition for the C-hub to
become advantageous becomes less stringent the larger her
connectivity. On the contrary, under the CPD paradigm, the
cost of cooperation plays a major role in the overall fitness of the
C-hub, which means that the larger her connectivity, the harder it
will be for the C-hub to become advantageous with respect to any
of her D-neighbors. Finally, the threshold conditions in Figure 2 also
show that under DPD the range of game interaction is enlarged, as
second neighbors of a hub also play a role in defining the invasion
thresholds, unlike what happens under CPC.T h ei n s i g h t s
provided by the prototypical configuration in Figure 2 become
more explicit if one computes the outcome of cooperation in SF
networks for social networks with different average connectivities
and both contributive schemes (Figure 3). As the average degree
(z ) becomes sizable cooperation will inevitably collapse [21,23],
but while cooperation can hardly resist for z .10 in the case of
CPD, under DPD Cs survive for values of z roughly four times
larger. This is of particular importance given that social networks
often exhibit high average connectivity values (2ƒzƒ100) [48]:
Cooperation prevails under a DPD contributive system, even on
non-sparse static network structures. For intermediate regimes of
heterogeneity (EXP networks), under DPD cooperation is also
sustained up to higher values of z, but to a lesser extent: Once
more, the impact of large hubs resulting from the preferential
attachment mechanism underlying SF networks plays an impres-
sive role under DPD.
The previous analysis allowed us to understand in which way
heterogeneous networks, by inducing a symmetry breaking into
the game dynamics, may favor cooperation. Furthermore,
Figures 1 and 3 show how this indeed happens when one starts
from initial conditions in which Cs occupy the nodes of a network
with 50% probability. This approach, which is recurrent in
numerical studies of evolutionary game dynamics, contrasts with
Figure 2. Invasion conditions for a hub-cooperator. From the definitions of the parameters in the figure one obtains that DPD leads
systematically to less stringent conditions for invasion of the C (squares) occupying the left hub, explaining the increased success of Cs under DPD.
On general heterogeneous populations with average connectivity z0, conditions a) and b), as well as c) and d), show that it is easier to invade a D
(circles) on a leaf than in the center of another hub. This invasion creates a positive feedback resulting from cooperative ‘‘leaves’’ surrounding the left
hub (k1 -k 2 increases) allowing a subsequent invasion of the right hub.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596.g002
Figure 3. Fraction of Cooperators as a function of the average
degree z of the social network. Cooperation is able to dominate on
sparse networks. Yet, only under DPD, combined with high levels of
heterogeneity of Scale-free networks, one observes the maintenance of
cooperative behavior in highly connected populations. The results were
obtained for networks of 10
3 nodes and F=1.8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596.g003
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game theory is rooted. There, the fact that all Cs and Dsi na n
infinite population have the same fitness, leads to a simple
replicator equation in which the rate of change of Csi s
proportional to a Gradient of selection G(x), the interior roots of
which dictate possible coexistence or coordination equilibria [14].
Here we shall define the finite population analog of G(x), valid for
any population size and structure (see Methods). In doing so we
overlook the microscopic details of the competition and self-
organization of Cs and Ds, but we gain an overview of the game
dynamics in a mean-field perspective. G becomes positive whenever
cooperation is favored by evolution and negative otherwise.
Whenever G=0, selection becomes neutral and evolution
proceeds by random drift. Naturally, G will depend implicitly on
the population structure, on the fraction x of Cs and also on how
these Cs are spread in the network. In Figure 4 we plot G(x) as a
function of x, for different values of F and different game
paradigms (CPD and DPD). Each configuration, here character-
ized by x, was generated assuming that each C (D) has, at least,
one C (D) in her neighborhood, replicating the conditions
observed in all numerical simulations. This is an important point,
as strategy assortation constitutes a characteristic feature of
evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations.
Figure 4 shows that, unlike what happens on homogeneous
networks, where Ds are always advantageous (not shown), SF
networks effectively transform a prisoner’s dilemma into a different
game. Figure 4a indicates that, in the case of CPD, introducing
diversity in roles and positions in the social network effectively
leads to a coordination game [57,58], characterized (in an infinite,
well-mixed population) by a critical fraction x* above which Cs are
always advantageous (G,0 for x,x* and G.0 for x.x*). This
result provides a powerful qualitative rationale for many results
obtained previously on heterogeneous networks under strong
selection [21,22,28] in which degree heterogeneity is shown to
induce cooperative behavior, inasmuch as the initial fraction of Cs
is sufficient to overcome the coordination threshold. Moreover,
Figure 4b shows that changing the contributive scheme from CPD
to DPD in SF population structures acts to change a prisoner’s
dilemma effectively into a Harmony game where Cs become
advantageous irrespectively of the fraction of Cs( x*<0).
Discussion
The present study puts in evidence the impact of breaking the
symmetry of cooperative contributions to the same game. On
strongly heterogeneous networks, the results of Figures 1b and 3
provide an impressive account of the impact of this diversity of
contributions. Overall, our results strongly suggest that whenever
the act of cooperation is associated to the act of contributing, and
not to the amount contributed, cooperation blooms inasmuch as the
structure of the social web is heterogeneous, leading individuals to
play diverse roles. The multiplicity of roles and contributions
induced by the social structure effectively transforms a local
cooperative dilemma into a global coordination game [57]. The
latter embodies an exemplary representation of the social contracts
[57] foundinseveralinstancesofanimal[59,60] and human[61,62]
collective dilemmas. This work provides additional evidence that,
while locally, cooperation can be understood as a prisoner’s
dilemma, globally, the possibilities opened by the intricate nature
of collective dynamics of cooperation [63] often lead to a dynamical
portrait that is effectively described by a coordination dilemma
instead of a defection dominance dilemma [57].
Methods
Each individual is assigned to a node of a network, whereas
interactions are represented by links between nodes. In each
generation, all pairs of individuals directly connected, engage in a
single round of the game. As usual, the accumulated payoff from
all interactions emulates the individual fitness (fi)o rsocial success and
the most successful individuals will tend to be imitated by their
neighbors. Such behavioral evolution is implemented using
the pairwise comparison rule [52,54]: at each time step an
individual x will adopt the strategy of a randomly chosen neighbor
y with a probability given by the ubiquitous Fermi distribution
p~ 1ze
{b fy{fx ðÞ
   {1
from statistical physics [52,54], in which
b, the inverse temperature in Physics, translates here into noise
associated with errors in decision making. For high values of b we
obtain the imitation dynamics commonly used in cultural
evolution studies whereas for b%1 evolution proceeds by random
drift. The strong selection regime that we adopt here (b=10.0)
enhances both the influence of the payoff values in the individual
fitness and the role played by the social network. It is noteworthy
that a detailed study of the impact of b on game dynamics on
heterogeneous networks is still lacking, unlike what happens on
homogeneous networks [52,54,64]. The results in Figures 1 and 3
were obtained for populations of N=10
3 individuals starting with
50% of Cs randomly distributed on the network. In all cases we
used the value c=1 for the cost of cooperation. The scale-free
networks were generated using a direct implementation of the
Figure 4. Gradients of selection G(x). a) Under the CPD paradigm,
Scale-free networks lead to the appearance of an unstable equilibrium
x* (open circles) and a scenario characteristic of a coordination game,
paving the way for cooperator dominance for frequencies above x*.b )
Under DPD, G(x) becomes positive for (almost) all values of x (x*,0.004
for F=1.50 and x*,0.006 for F=1.25), leading to a scenario
characteristic of a Harmony game, where cooperators dominate
unconditionally. In both panels the networks employed had 500 nodes
and an average degree z=4, whereas b=10.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596.g004
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attachment [65], whereas exponential networks were generated
replacing the preferential attachment by uniform attachment in
the previous model [49]. Different mechanisms could be used
[38,42,48,66–68] to generate SF degree distributions portraying
features not present in the BA model. In general, however, SF
networks lead to evolutionary dynamical behaviors which are
similar to those observed in BA networks [24,27,42,68–70], which
may also depend on the way individual fitness is defined
[23,29,71,72]. The equilibrium fraction of Cs results from
averaging over 2000 generations after a transient period of 10
5
generations and each point in Figures 1 and 3 corresponds to an
average over 10
3 runs and networks. The results are independent
from the updating strategy (synchronous, asynchronous), popula-
tion size (N .500) and robust to the existence of a small number of
mutations in each time-step. In Figure 4, gradients of selection
were obtained by calculating Gx ðÞ ~Tz x ðÞ {T{ x ðÞ , where
Tz x ðÞT{ x ðÞ ðÞ is the average frequency of transitions increasing
(decreasing) the number of Cs for each random configuration with
xN Cs. G(x) represents a finite population analogue (using the
pairwise comparison rule [52,54]) of the gradient of selection in
infinite well-mixed populations Gx ðÞ ~x 1{x ðÞ fC{fD ðÞ [14],
where fC and fD are the fitness values of Cs and Ds. Each value
was obtained by averaging over 10
5 different randomly generated
configurations and networks.
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